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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
TRACY BROWN, 
Plaintiff-A ppellant, 
vs. 
D A N N I E M A R R E L L I , 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
S T A T E M E N T OF CASE 
A N D D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
This is a civil paternity suit. The lower court 
granted defendant's Motion to Dismiss. 
S T A T E M E N T O F FACTS 
The State of Utah commenced a bastardy action 
against defendant on plaintiff's complaint on the 7th 
day of July, 1972, Salt Lake County Criminal No. 
24599. During the course of this prosecution plaintiff's 
parents became apprehensive as to whether the case 
would be vigorously prosecuted (R.4) and hence plain-
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tiff's father employed Ralph Sheffield, attorney at law 
of St. George, Utah to work with John B. Anderson, 
the Deputy District Attorney who was handling the 
case in the interest of plaintiff. Even so, vital and 
critical evidence and arguments were not presented to 
the jury and as a result the defendant was found "not 
guilty." 
The evidence and arguments which were not pre-
sented to the jury were the following: 
1. The explanation as to why plaintiff did not 
tell defendant nor anyone else about her pregnant con-
dition until the fifth month after intercourse. (R.40) 
The absence of this evidence allowed the defense 
counsel to argue as follows: 
"The glaring thing in this testimony, if 
this young man had intercourse with her, which 
he expressly denies, she, by her own testimony, 
knew where he lived, what he was doing, having 
called him, so she knew what his number was, 
but she goes through January, February, 
March, April, May until the middle of June, 
indicating, and that on my question, I said, 
'When did you know you were pregnant?' 
And she said when she went to see the doctor 
on the 23rd of June." 
2. The facts that plaintiff and defendant had 
been alone and kissing on three or four occasions 
(R. 7, 8) prior to the act of intercourse which resulted 
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in pregnancy (T. 93) As a result defendant's counsel 
argued in the State case as follows: 
"That's the only time she ever claims they 
had been together. Never been out together, 
never had a date. (T 150,1 28-30) 
3. The evidence of plaintiffs attending physician 
that the baby was born sioc days prior to the eoopected 
date, that the baby's physical condition was entirely 
consistent with her birth 259 days after intercourse and 
the absence of bleeding on that occasion is consistent 
with plaintiffs testimony that she was then a virgin. 
(R.41) 
The absence of such testimony enabled defendant's 
counsel to argue as follows: 
"The State has chosen, for reasons un-
known to me, not to put on medical evidence 
as to the possible time of conception, that sort 
of thing. One thing I'll ask you people to do, 
and you are allowed under these instructions 
to use your own common sense, your own ex-
perience and inferences arising therefrom to 
determine where the truth lies in this matter. 
The testimony by Miss Brown is that the only 
time she was ever alone with Dannie Marrelli 
was on or about the 8th or 9th of January. The 
baby was born on the 25th of September. I 
think if you'll take the 22 days remaining in 
January, the number of days in February, 
March, April, May, June, July, August, and 
25 days in September, you will find on that 
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basis, a 259-day pregnancy. Of course, as I say, 
the State hasn't chosen to give us any medical 
evidence as to whether this was a term birth 
or pre-term birth. There is no evidence before 
you as to the length of time for a term birth. 
However, in selecting this jury, I noted, and 
I'm sure Mr. Anderson did, and the judge, that 
each of you are sitting in the box at the present 
time have one or more children. I think you 
have had some experience with these things." 
(T 146, 147) 
4. Testimony of David Barton and Wayne Lam' 
bert that they had not had seooual intercourse with her 
at any time. (R ) 
Defendant's counsel inferred that one of them 
might well be the father. He argued: 
"Now, the only basis that we have for 
believing this woman hadn't had intercourse 
with other people, there are two of them, (1) 
she said she hadn't and (2) she claims she 
wasn't going out with any people during that 
time. Of course, her mother remembered people 
she had gone out with during that time. She 
had gone to ball games. She was going to 
dances. Is it reasonable to believe that this 
young lady, when she found out she was in 
trouble, worried about it for a period of five 
months, possibly talked to someone else, and 
possibly someone else was out of town and then 
went to the person she admits she wanted to 
be introduced t o . . . " (T 149) 
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5. Mrs. Marrelli was not called as a witness even 
though she was present during a meeting of the mother, 
the alleged father and their parents. 
Some people won't lie under any circumstances, 
not even in aid of their kin. Mrs. Marrelli is probably 
one of them as it seems certain that she would have been 
a witness for her son (as her husband was) if the 
testimony she would give would have been favorable 
to him. This should have been evident when the defense 
failed to call her. Had she been called as a rebuttal 
witness (to testify that the defendant did acknowledge 
being the father as Tracy (T 49), her mother (T 76) 
and her father (T 124) had testified but which the 
defendant (T 99 and his father denied (T 117) but 
disappointed the State's counsel in not contradicting 
her son and her husband there would nevertheless have 
been a positive benefit to the State's case as it would 
have emphasized the fact that such a meeting did indeed 
take place and why would a boy who denied being the 
father first meet with the mother to be and her father 
(T 102) then with both grandfathers to be (T 116) 
and finally with the mother to be and all the grand-
parents to be (T 119) if in fact he was not the father?. 
That Mrs. Marrelli was actually at the last referred to 
meeting could not have been denied by her without dis-
crediting her son who had so testified (T 103) and her 
husband who had so testified (T 119). I t should also be 
noted that all these meetings took place two days after 
Tracy told Dannie he was the father (T 102). 
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6. The State's attorney objected to defense coun-
sel's request of his client as to why he attended all the 
above meetings if he had not had intercourse with Tracy. 
Q. (Attorney Sumner J . Hatch) "Mr. Marrelli, 
if you are sure you are not the father of that child, 
why did you go to those meetings ?" 
Mr. Anderson: "I'll object as to the materiality." 
Court: "Sustained. Well, its otherwise objection-
able." 
Thus the jury was deprived of the answer to what 
was probably the most significant question that could 
be asked of the defendant and the State was foreclosed 
from discrediting that answer and from dwelling on the 
implausability of the defendant attending all those meet-
ings if he could not have been the father when that 
meeting was about the father's responsibility. 
7. Absence of rebuttal argument to defendant's 
counsel argument that pldintiff was not telling the truth 
about defendant asking her to bring her year book to 
his dormitory room so they could pick out a girl for his 
roommate since his roomate already had a Skyline High 
School year book. (T. 151) 
Rebuttal arguments that should have been made: 
(1) Defendant admitted that plaintiff did bring a year 
book (R 91). (2) If he wanted to get plaintiff into 
his room for immoral purposes it wouldn't matter 
whether he really wanted to see the year book or not, 
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(3) his roommate graduated in a class two years before 
plaintiff so it was an entirely different year book. 
(R ) 
As a consequence defendant's counsel made this 
argument to the jury: "She comes up and says, ' I want 
to show you the yearbook'. (T. 151) He testifies there 
was a yearbook of the same year and school there at 
the time. Why would he want her to bring a yearbook? 
He's watching the football game." 
And that argument was never challenged! Since 
credibility was the key issue this item may well have 
been the deciding factor. 
In as much as the camplaint in question was dis-
missed without any evidentary hearing, the references to 
the record (R) or transcript (T) where the facts as 
plaintiff claims them to be established are not proof of 
those facts as no testimony or documents were intro-
duced into evidence. The purpose of making them part 
of the record is to show by affidavits what proof is 
available to sustain plaintiff's contention that she ought 
not to be barred by the result of the prior proceedings 
for reasons set forth in the argument to follow: 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
I T W A S E R R O R FOR T H E L O W E R 
COURT TO G R A N T D E F E N D A N T ' S MOTION 
TO D I S M I S S W I T H O U T A L L O W I N G P L A I N -
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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T I F F AN E V I D E N T I A R Y H E A R I N G ON 
T H E D E F E N S E OF R E S J U D I C A T A . 
The Order of Dismissal with Prejudice here ap-
pealed from is based on the grounds of res judicata 
and granted pursuant to defendant's Motion to Dismiss 
on that ground. Rule 12 (b) U.R.C.P. promises that 
every defense shall be asserted in the responsive plead-
ing thereto if one is required, except that the following 
defenses may at the option of the pleader be made by 
motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, 
(2) lack of jurisdiction over the person, (3) improper 
venue, (4) insufficiency of process, (5) insufficiency 
or service of process, (6) failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted, (7) failure to join an in-
dispensable party. A motion making any of these de-
fenses shall be made before pleading if a further plead-
ing is permitted. 
Clearly res judicata is not one of those grounds 
for which such a motion lies and on which it can be 
granted. 
Rule 8 (c) on the other hand provides that res 
judicata is one of the 19 specific affirmative defenses 
that must be pleaded by the defendant in his Answer. 
Here defendant had filed no answer. Here there has 
been no hearing on the issues raised by such an answer. 
Procedurally the order in question is in error and 
should be reversed. However, unless plaintiff is also 
right as to the substantive issue which follows there 
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would be no benefit to anyone to remand the cause for 
further proceeding, hence Point I I . 
P O I N T I I 
P L A I N T I F F ' S P R E S E N T S U I T IS NOT 
B A R R E D BY R E S J U D I C A T A OR COLLATE-
R A L E S T O P P E L B E C A U S E S H E H A S 
N E V E R H A D A F A I R A D V E R S A R Y P R E S -
E N T A T I O N OF H E R CAUSE. 
Res judicata is wisely grounded on the policy that 
a party who has had one fair trial on an issue should 
not have a second one. However, as the California 
Supreme Court said in the case of Jorgensen v. Jorgenr 
sen (1948), 32 Cal 2d 13, 18, 193 Pd 728, 732 (and 
recently cited with approval in People v. Camp, 10 Cal 
App 3d 651, app. 89 Cal. Reptr. 242 (1970), "This 
policy must be considered together with the policy that 
a party shall not be deprived of a fair adversary pro-
ceeding in which fully to present his case." 
The issue in question is within the scope of an A L R 
Annotation on the subject, "Judgment in bastardy pro-
ceeding as conclusive of issues in subsequent bastardy 
proceeding" published in 37 A L R 2d 836. None of the 
cases cited therein, however, are sufficiently similar to 
the facts in the instant case to be useful as precedents. 
The author, however, declares, "There is nothing in the 
nature of a bastardy proceeding which necessarily pre-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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vents the application therein of the general principle 
that a final judgment on the merits is conclusive as be-
tween the same parties on the same issue in a later pro-
ceeding (P. 836, 837, emphasis added). Of course case 
law is clear to the effect that persons who are privies 
to the parties as well as the parties themselves are sub-
ject to the limitation of res judicata. In 46 Am Jur 
2d 683, under Sec 532 of "Judgments'' it is stated: 
"A trial in which one party contests his 
claim against another should be held to estop 
a third person only when it is realistic to say 
that the third person was fully protected in the 
first trial. There can be no such privity be-
tween persons as to produce collateral estoppel 
unless the result can be defended on principles 
of fundamental fairness in the due process 
sense." 
The real issue in this appeal is whether the results 
in the prior State case "can be defended on principles 
of fundamental fairness in the due process sense." 
Bearing in mind that the control of the case was 
primarily, if not entirely, in the hands of the District 
Attorney and his assigned counsel, can it be said that 
plaintiff was adequately represented by counsel in the 
State trial? Certainly that issue has not been the subject 
of any evidentiary hearing. Plaintiff submits that Rule 
13 of U.R.C.P. requires such a hearing and proof by 
defendant that she had such representation in fact in the 
prior case before it bars her present suit. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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In the case of Alters v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 118, 
449 P 2d 241, this court held that a party convicted of 
burglary and sentenced to serve a term of one to twenty 
years in the Utah State Prison was entitled to a new 
trial when his representation did not meet the require-
ments of due process. There this court said: 
We are not here concerned with the credit-
ability of petitioner's story. I t might be said 
that parts of it seem quite incredible, or even 
foolish. But hindsight seem foolish even to 
themselves. On the basis of this record, we 
think the only reasonable conclusion to de drawn 
therefrom is that if petitioner had had counsel 
actively interested in protecting his rights the 
result may have been more favorable to him. 
The right of an accused to have counsel 
as assured by Sec. 12, Art. I, Utah Constitu-
tion, and by the VI and X I V Amendments 
to the U. S. Constitution is one of those rights 
''rooted in the traditions and conscience of our 
people" as essential to the protection of indi-
vidual liberties and therefore included in our 
concept of due process of law. The require-
ment is not satisfied by a sham or pretense 
of an appearance in the record by an attorney 
who manifests no real concern about the in-
terests of the accused. The entitlement is to 
the assistance of a competent-member of the 
Bar, who shows a willingness to identify him-
self with the interests of the defendant and 
present such defense as are available to him 
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under the law and consistent with the ethics 
of the profession. 
The failure of such representation for the 
petitioner herein is a departure from due pro-
cess of law. This has been recognized as one 
of the exceptions from the rule of finality of 
judgments, and which may therefore be at-
tacked collaterally under habeas corpus/' (Em-
phasis added, foot notes omitted) 
Should one convicted of crime be entitled to greater 
constitutional protection than the mother of an illegiti-
mate child? Should an illegitimate child be less entitled 
to his or her day in court than a presumably legitimate 
child is entitled to the same rule of evidence needed to 
convict one of crime? Holder v. Holder, 9 Utah 2d 
163, 340 P 2d 761. 
I t must be clearly understood that granting the 
relief plaintiff is seeking would not open up the door 
to retry every bastardy case that was lost by the County 
Attorney hereafter (incidentally there have been only 
29 acquitals in the past 22 years in the entire State of 
Utah according to the official published reports for the 
period July 1, 1948 to June 30, 1972. There were 625 
bastardy trials reported in said publications) (See ap-
pendix). This case would be precedent for retrials only 
when at least three other elements occur. First, no 
one was told of the pregnancy for over five months 
after the sex act occured so as to require a more careful 
prosecution. Second, counsel for the mother failed to call 
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the other males the alleged father linked to the com-
plaining witness. Third, the mother's counsel failed to 
call the attending physician when birth occured 259 days 
after the act of intercourse. 
It should be noted as to the factors just listed that 
proof the those facts clearly appears from the transcript 
of the State's prior case standing alone. (As to (1) -
T63.Asto (2) and (3 ) -T2) 
This is a case of initial impression despite the dicta 
in State v Judd 27 Utah 279, 493 P.2d 604, hence this 
court is free to do justice between the parties so 
long as its precedent does not establish a policy which is 
inamicable to justice hereafter. As noted above, it is 
almost certain that no other case will ever be retried as 
a result of the decision in this case. But what about 
justice to this particular defendant? Certainly, it was 
not his fault nor his counsel's fault that the State's 
case was so handled that plaintiff did not have her fair 
day in court. Should he bear the expense of a second 
trial? No. The equitable powers of the courts are such 
that he who seeks equity should be required to do equity 
and the defendant's expenses of a second trial including 
reasonable attorney's fees should be assessed to the 
plaintiff if he prevails or be deducted from the pay 
ments he is ordered to make if plaintiff prevails. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order of Dismissal should be vacated and this 
case remanded to the District Court of Salt Lake Coun-
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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ty with appropriate instructions relative to trial of the 
issue of res judicata and the expenses of further pro-
ceedings if a new trial is found justified under the 
Alters exception to the res judicata rule. 
Respectfully Submitted 
R O B E R T B. H A N S E N 
838 - 18th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
Attorney for 
Plaintiff-Appellant 
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